ABSTRACT Communication between individuals of a species is likely to increase the capacity to acquire skills useful for survival and propagation and thus may confer important selective advantages. Since interaction occurs between two or more individuals, the selective process is frequency dependent, and the analysis shows that communication cannot initially increase at a reasonable rate when it is limited to random unrelated individuals, so that it is likely to abort for stochastic reasons. However, this bottleneck is removed if the communication process takes place in the nuclear family or among close relatives or if aggregation of communicators occurs because of assortative mating or meeting. Use of the individual conditional fitnesses we have introduced earlier permits an exact analysis. We show that, in general, the initial rate of increase can be geometric if and only if, in the class of selective models considered, the conditional probability of a communicator interacting with another contains a positive constant term. In our discussion of communication, cost factors for the act of communication have been omitted. However, the model has been generalized to include cooperativeness, and also altruism, or competition, by introducing costs. There is a close relationship among these situations, and the same considerations about the initial bottleneck and its resolution also extend to them. The models given here are for haploids but they extend to diploids and the conclusions are similar.
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We have studied some theoretical aspects of the problem of evolution of communication between two or more individuals, the key ingredient of cultural behavior. Communication is taken to include the range extending from the simplest examplesfor instance, the recognition of a parent in an imprinting situation or the capacity to learn a skill by imitation-to the most complex ones involving communication by language. When there is genetic variation in the capacity to acquire or to communicate a specific ability that is subject to natural selection, it seems intuitively likely that there will be evolution toward more efficient communication if the skills thus learned have positive selective value (and vice versa if negative). In the course of the theoretical treatment, it was found that there is a bottleneck in the evolutionary process of communication at its very beginning.
Not surprisingly, there are similarities between communication, cooperativeness, sociality, altruism. Axelrod and Hamilton (1) have explicitly drawn attention to the existence of a dilemma, whereby a genetic trait determining cooperativeness that is initially rare (as all new mutants are) cannot increase in a population. They base their argument on the approach by game theory. Using this same approach, Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza (2) have shown that it is possible for cooperativeness to increase if there is any tendency for cooperative individuals to aggregate, because of assortative mating or meeting (passively or actively sought). Boorman In this paper, we show how the dilemma can be solved in a more general way. We will use the method of individual conditional fitness that we have introduced for the treatment of kinship (5), which we suggest can be generalized to a great variety of interactions between individuals.
In principle, communication will always involve a reciprocal interaction between a communicator and a recipient. More than one individual of either category may be involved, but we will limit our consideration to interaction in pairs. More general treatments will consider separately the abilities to communicate, to receive the communication, and to actually acquire the skills that are communicated. In simpler cases, variation may exist for only one of these, but there may well be variation for all. We will not consider effects of variation for the third capacity here but will elaborate models in which there is joint variation in the first two abilities. Separate variation in the communicating (teaching) and receiving (understanding) abilities will be considered elsewhere.
The models developed here show that cultural-interactions within the nuclear family or among close relatives can have considerable importance in fostering the evolution of communication. They also indicate that assortative--cting and meeting may play a substantial role. In addition, we will show that these models can also be viewed as special cases of a general model of evolution of cooperation and altruism, to which results on communication are easily generalized. The-treatment will mainly be limited to haploids with sexual recombination (or equivalent transmission schemes). Only simple cases of diploids will be treated in connection with earlier results (5).
Communication in haploids
We first consider a model of haploid transmission with random mating, As in our earlier work on "altruism" (5), fitness is regarded as a property of the individual. Communication per se probably has no direct effect on 'fitness but, if it leads to the acquisition of information that can increase individual fitness, Abbreviation: CK, conditional kinship (matrix).
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then its indirect selective effect may be important. Of course, for an effect on the fitness of an individual to be realized, other individuals capable of communication must be present; the passage of information requires a minimum of two individuals.
We will assume for simplicity that (i) communication is reciprocal; i.e., individuals who are communicators can also xeceive information; (ii) all individuals can potentially learn a skill for survival if they are communicators; and (iii) all adult communicators have acquired the skill that confers increased fitness.
The individual fitness of a communicator (type A) who has been in contact with other communicators will be 1 + (3, relative to fitness of 1 for noncommunicators (type a). At generation t, the frequency of communicators is ut (Vt = 1 -Ut), and at birth the offspring frequency of A is again ut.. However, by communicating with other A individuals, a fitness increment proportional to their frequency accrues to the communicators, whose fitness is therefore [5] where a constant (, measures effective communication. Thus, after communication, the new-frequency, ut,1 is Ut+I =-Ut (1 + outt), [2] The denominator is obtained from the sum of communicators Ut (1 + PUt) and noncommunicators, vt, after selection. We sup, press the time subscript and write u for ub u' for ut+i,. Naturally U' > u if ( > 0, so that u increases monotonically and communication will spread in the population. But the key evolutionary problem is at the beginning-i.e., at the time when there are very few communicators and therefore u is close to zero. The rate of increase is u' 1+fu u 1 + pU2 [3] and, taking the limit of this ratio for u = 0, the initial rate is one, so that the trait for communication cannot increase at a geometric rate. At most, the increase is very slow and this is probably the explicit formulation of the evolutionary paradox already noted by Axelrod and Hamilton for cooperativeness. In the case of communication, we have a simple proposal to solve the paradox. Communication (e.g., language in man) is usually learned first in the family-i.e., by the child from the parents (and sibs and possibly other close relatives). To model this, we follow our earlier approach (5). of conditional kinship matrices (CK), which allow us to compute the probability that a relative (of a given degree) of an individual with a given genotype has a specified genotype. This matrix, in the case of haploids and the child-parent relationship, is most simply calculated'from the frequencies of types of matings and their progeny (random mating assumed), as shown in Table 1 The fitness of an A individual does not depend only on the frequency u of the trait in the parental generation but also on the probability that the individual' has learned from -his parents. The fitness of the A type will, be 1 + You + ,1 (u + v/2), [6] where the uoU component derives from adult contact with the general adult population (as in Eq . 1) [8] which is >1 if (,i > 0, so that the contribution from parental teaching allows the evolutionary process to commence. Later, the contribution from other members of the parental generation, which we have called "oblique" in the context of cultural transmission (6), will contribute to make the process faster. At the end of the process, the rate (lim v'/v, v -+ 0) for fixation of communicators is 1/(1 + P3o + 3i) and here, as during the rest of the process for u > 0, the oblique contribution is important.
Sib-sib communication requires another CK matrix. The general term of this matrix is ,Pk'P(child Ailk)P(child Ajlk) f'AjA, = P(sib AjIsib Ai) = k E Pk.P(child Ailk) - [9] In the case of haploids with random mating, the sib/sib.CK matrix is identical to the' parent-child matrix, and the evolutionary conclusion is therefore also identical. Adding to the oblique term the contributions from parent-child (with Al) and sib-sib (with (2) In all conditions for initial increase, incorporation of the cost term y will simply result in subtraction of y from lim.,ou'/u, so that, for instance for altruism between members of pairs in assortative mating or meeting, the condition for initial increase would become Y/P3<m [18] and for parent-child or sib-sib altruism (with assortative mating of the model 1 or 2 type), the condition is y/P < (1 + m)/2.
[19]
If the more general notation given for the game theory analogue in Table 4 Proc. Nad Acad. Sci. USA 80 (1983) nicator. Thus, the advantage of communication can be established immediately and, even if there is only one communicator in the whole population, the first nucleus of communication will be the family this individual begets. Ignoring stochastic factors that affect the probability of every initial increase, the evolution of communication can thus begin promptly.
Here, we have presented a treatment of the evolutionary increase of communication between parent-child or sib-sib and with unrelated invididuals (oblique transmission). This is made possible by the use of individual fitnesses, conditional on the frequency of communicators among relatives; the same treatment can be extended to interaction with nonrelatives, as in the three models of assortative mating (or meeting) also considered. In fact, we show that the determinant of the initial increase is the constant term in the conditional probability that the communicator interacts with another communicator. In the class of models here considered, the necessary and sufficient condition for geometric initial rate of increase of communication is that the constant term of this conditional probability is positive.
While it is possible that there is no fitness cost, only benefit, to being a communicator, it is easy to introduce fitness costs. The more general models thus generated show the close relationships existing between communication, cooperativeness, altruism, and in general social interactions, so that one can with a single model summarize all these situations.
Thus, our analysis shows that there is indeed a bottleneck at the beginning of the evolutionary process, when a mutant with increased communication, cooperativeness, or altruism (not directed necessarily to close relatives) is first introduced into a population, so that, under interaction between random unrelated individuals, the evolutionary process will be so slow that the increase of communicators, etc., will in practice be neg- Our models are for haploids, although some of these conclusions have been extended to diploids by using the same procedure. Moreover, we do not distinguish the capacities to acquire and to give information, and we assume that both are increased in the new genetic type A, called "communicator" in comparison with the older type a, called noncommunicator. A distinction between the two will be given in another paper.
